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Executive Summary 
The EPA’s new regulation to protect ground water, the Pesticides and Ground 
Water Management Plan rule, will not significantly decrease health risks. Existing 
evidence suggests that the risk from ground water contamination is low and states have 
effective ground water protection programs. It is therefore unlikely that extensive federal 
involvement is necessary to protect ground water.  
The EPA has indicated it will use the new regulation to require states to expand 
their programs. The EPA did not, however, estimate the benefits of expanding ground 
water protection in the proposed rule, consider the risk of alternative pesticides, or show 
that the actual level of risk is potentially greater than existing data suggest. 
 In this paper, I illustrate an approach for estimating the benefits and costs of 
ground water protection based on a case study of ground water contamination in 
California’s San Joaquin Valley. The study shows that the health risk from ground water 
contamination is low, the costs of reducing contamination are high, and California is 
effectively protecting ground water. The study also shows that better analysis of the 
benefits and costs of ground water protection in each state can help the EPA determine 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Left unchecked, ground water contamination from pesticide use presents risks to 
human health and the environment. A high level of ground water contamination, for 
example, increases the risk of cancer from drinking water in rural areas and adversely 
impacts ecosystems.
1 The EPA proposed the Pesticides and Ground Water Management 
Plan (PMP) rule in 1996 to address this potential risk, and plans to finalize it by the end 
of 1999. The EPA designed the rule to prevent risks from ground water contamination 
resulting from the use of alachlor, atrazine, cyanazine, metolachlor, and simazine. In this 
paper, I show that the EPA could provide better estimates of the benefits and costs of 
protecting ground water than it provided in the proposed rule. I support this finding with 
a case study of simazine contamination in California’s San Joaquin Valley. I further 
argue that better analysis of the benefits and costs of ground water protection could help 
the EPA determine the appropriate level of federal involvement in state ground water 
protection activities. 
The EPA’s PMP rule is only the most recent action in a series of actions related to 
its ground water protection program.
2 The EPA first addressed concerns about 
widespread ground water contamination in the early 1980s, and outlined its plan for the 
future in the agency’s 1991 Pesticides and Ground Water Strategy.
3 The five PMP 
herbicides are the most heavily used herbicides in the nation. Once the rule is final, each 
state must submit a plan for each herbicide to the EPA within two years, subject to 
                                                 
1 The primary benefit of ground water contamination reduction is a decrease in the risk of cancer and non-
cancer risks to human health from drinking water. Ground water contamination also could adversely impact 
ecosystems because ground water is often connected to lakes, streams, or other surface water bodies. 
Ground water also has “existence value,” which is the value to society of knowing that the nation’s ground 
water sources are, and will remain, relatively pristine. Protection of microorganisms living in ground water 
is also cited as a potential benefit, although it is probably very small. 
2 The PMP rule applies to both states and tribal lands, in addition to the six U.S. territories. I refer to “state” 
plans throughout the paper.  
3 USEPA (1991).  2 
approval by the EPA’s regional offices. The EPA could ban the use of the PMP 
herbicides in any state that does not submit a plan the EPA approves.  
Existing monitoring data suggest that the PMP herbicides generally are not found 
in ground water at levels that exceed the EPA’s safety standards. A forthcoming study by 
the United States Geological Survey (USGS) synthesizes information on nationwide 
ground water monitoring results for the PMP herbicides since 1991. The USGS found 
only two wells with concentrations of a PMP pesticide that exceeded the EPA’s safety 
standards.
4,5 A study conducted by Abt Associates, Inc., commissioned by the EPA, 
shows that the nationwide ground water contamination from all pesticides used on corn 
crops is associated with between .4 and 5 cancer cases per year.
6 Atrazine contamination 
is responsible for nearly all the estimated cancer cases, although the study includes all 
five PMP pesticides and twenty additional pesticides used on corn crops. The study also 
concludes that non-cancer risks are very low. 
Data on PMP herbicide use shows that the level of use was relatively consistent 
from 1990 to 1995, so it is unlikely the risk from ground water contamination will 
increase above existing levels in the future. Atrazine, alachlor, cyanazine, and 
metolachlor are used primarily on field crops, while simazine is used primarily on fruit 
and nut crops. The amount of atrazine used on field crops has declined from 45 million 
pounds in 1990 to 39 million pounds in 1995.
7 Alachlor use during that period declined 
from 41 million pounds to 11 million pounds, cyanazine use has increased slightly from 
                                                 
4  The Safe Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to set a Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) for each 
contaminant it determines may present a public health concern. The MCL is based on studies of the effect 
of the herbicide on laboratory animals, and the results are extrapolated to humans. Safe Drinking Water 
Act, 42 USC § 300(g)–1 (b)(4)) (1996). 
5USGS (forthcoming). Personal communication with Jack Barbash, primary author of the forthcoming 
study, January 1999.  
6 Abt Associates, Inc. (1994). The study is important because the risk of ground water contamination 
resulting from PMP herbicide use on corn crops was one of the motivating factors behind the PMP rule. 
The estimate of cancer cases is based on the results of a model that simulated the expected concentration of 
pesticides in ground water over twenty years. The concentration estimates are within the range of 
concentration found in published field studies, and are based on information about the level of use, soil 
characteristics, weather, level of irrigation, planting and harvesting, application practices, and the chemical 
characteristics of the pesticides. The study assumes a three meter depth to ground water for the low 
estimate of cancer cases and a one meter depth to ground water for the high estimate. It uses the EPA’s risk 
assessment guidelines to calculate the cancer risk, and makes conservative assumptions about population 
exposure. 
7 USDA (1997). 3 
22 million pounds to 24 million pounds, and metolachlor has held steady at around 37 
million pounds.  
The EPA has indicated it will require states to expand their ground water 
protection programs, despite evidence of low risks from ground water contamination. The 
EPA also has not shown that the actual level of risk is greater than existing data suggest. 
The EPA could, for example, answer the following questions: What is the maximum 
level of existing risk? How much will the risk increase in the future? What are the costs 
of reducing uncertainty about risk? These are important questions because the answers 
will help the EPA determine the appropriate level of additional ground water protection, 
if the EPA believes existing data is not adequate to estimate risk. In this paper, I evaluate 
existing data and recommend ways to improve the EPA’s approach to protecting ground 
water based on the resulting analysis.  
In Section II, I discuss the need for federal involvement in state efforts to protect 
ground water from PMP herbicide contamination. In Section III, I evaluate the EPA’s 
economic analysis of the proposed rule. In Section IV, I present a study of the benefits 
and costs of ground water contamination from simazine in California’s San Joaquin 
Valley to illustrate a way to collect more information on the benefits and costs of 
contamination reduction. In Section V, I recommend ways in which the EPA can help 
states improve their ground water protection programs at low cost. 
 
II.  Should the Federal Government Help States Protect Ground Water? 
 
The need for government involvement in ground water protection efforts is the 
source of an ongoing debate between environmental interests and farmers. Environmental 
interests argue that the extent and severity of ground water contamination is poorly 
understood, despite nationwide monitoring efforts. Farmers argue their ability to maintain 
a steady income, as well as the supply of cheap and fresh produce in the market, depends 
on the continued use of low-cost pesticides. They further argue that these economic and 
health benefits outweigh the low health risks that pesticide use presents. The extent of 
government involvement in efforts to clean up ground water depends on some resolution 
of this debate.  4 
 Government involvement in ground water protection efforts could have an 
economic rationale if there is evidence of a market failure.
8 The primary market failures 
associated with ground water contamination are the externality resulting from ground 
water contamination that moves off the original site of application, and insufficient 
provision of information about risks. An externality can exist if a pesticide moves off a 
farmer’s fields through ground water and contaminates the drinking water wells of 
neighboring farmers or otherwise causes harm to third parties.
9 The Safe Drinking Water 
Act requires constant monitoring and evaluation of water quality in wells that regularly 
serve at least 25 people. The only potential externalities that the federal government does 
not already regulate are therefore from contamination in wells that serve under 25 people, 
typically in rural areas, and to the environment if the ground water contamination spreads 
to surface water. It is unlikely, however, that pesticides often move off the original site of 
application. In the San Joaquin Valley, for example, the sedimentary architecture and the 
amount of irrigation result in maximum rates of movement on the order of 100 meters per 
year.
10 Since the PMP pesticides generally break down to harmless compounds in less 
than three months, the pesticides probably do not move off the original site of application 
in the San Joaquin Valley. In other states, however, different soil types or levels of 
irrigation could increase the rate at which pesticides move off the original site.  
Second, the market may not provide sufficient information about risks.
11 
Residents in an area susceptible to contamination benefit from the provision of additional 
information about risk because they can then take action to prevent the risk and because it 
reduces “dread” of the risk.
12  The high cost of ground water monitoring, however, gives 
each farmer the incentive to let neighboring farmers incur the costs of monitoring while 
he/she reaps the benefits of that information. Individual farmers have the incentive to 
monitor on their own property, assuming they are cognizant of the potential risk, but not 
                                                 
8For more information on the justification for government involvement when market failures exist, see the 
Office of Management and Budget’s 1996 “Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive 
www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OMB/html/miscdoc/riaguide.html.  
9 An externality exists when the welfare of an individual depends directly on his or her activities in addition 
to activities under the control of some other individual. Tietenberg (1992). 
10 Personal communication, Stuart Rojstaczer, Professor of Hydrology, Duke University, June 1999. 
11 Ground water monitoring data is a public good, and is efficiently provided if the provision of an 
additional increment of data can not make one person better off without making another person worse off. 
Rosen (1995).  5 
to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive ground water monitoring program 
for their agricultural region.  
In states with high levels of pesticide use, state agencies are already taking action 
to protect ground water and to reduce uncertainty about the level of risk.
13 California, 
Wisconsin, and Florida, for example, have ground water protection programs that started 
in the 1980s. California passed the Pesticide Prevention and Control Act in 1986 and 
Wisconsin passed the Ground Water Law in 1983.
14 Also in 1983, Florida passed the 
Florida Water Quality Assurance Act, which established a ground water quality 
monitoring network. Comprehensive ground water protection programs followed passage 
of these laws. As a result of these programs, state representatives assert that ground water 
contamination resulting from pesticide use has declined. These states, in addition to many 
others, worry about the impact of the PMP rule. States with low levels of PMP herbicide 
use, for example, fear the EPA will require them to expand their monitoring programs at 
high cost, regardless of existing levels of risk.
15 States with high levels of PMP herbicide 
use also fear that the EPA will require extensive ground water monitoring, regardless of 
ongoing efforts to protect ground water or resource constraints.
16  
In the rest of this paper, I explore how to determine the extent of EPA 
involvement in state ground water protection activities, given low levels of risk, 
uncertainty associated with estimates of risk, and the success of ongoing state ground 
water protection programs.
17   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Public perception of risk and its influence on agency priorities has been extensively discussed in the 
literature. See, for example, Slovak et al. (1985), Viscusi and Magat (1987), and Sunstein (1996). 
13 The information is based on personal communication with state and federal government representatives, 
environmental interests, and agricultural interests. The information in this section is presented only to 
provide examples of ongoing state efforts, and is not representative of all states.   
14California’s Pesticide Prevention and Control Act was passed in part because of the detection of high 
concentrations of popular pesticides in well water and in part because 80% of California’s small drinking 
water systems, primarily in agricultural regions, rely on ground water. Pease et al. (1995).  
15 Personal communication with Barry Patterson, Director of Agricultural and Environmental Services, 
New Mexico Department of Agriculture, August 1996 and with John Smith, Program Administrator, North 
Carolina Department of Agriculture, July 1996. 
16 Personal communication with Dr. Marion Fuller, Florida Department of Agriculture. August 1996.  
17 If one assumes that most of the people drinking from wells serving under 25 people are the same farmers 
that applied the pesticides that contaminate the ground water, and that the pesticides do not move off-site 
into other people’s wells, there is no externality. While this is an interesting point, I do not pursue it in this 
paper because the complexity of hydrologic systems prevents me from making the assumption that 6 
III.  Evaluation of the EPA’s Economic Analysis of the Proposed Rule 
 
The EPA conducted an economic impact analysis of the PMP rule, as required by 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866. While the EPA arguably complied 
superficially with the economic analysis requirements in the executive order, the EPA did 
not provide defensible estimates of the benefits and costs of its proposed strategy or 
consider a reasonable range of alternatives.  
The EPA provided no estimate of the benefits of contamination reduction in the 
proposed rule. In place of a benefits estimation, the agency simply stated that “Due to the 
preventative nature of [Pesticide] Management Plans and general methodological 
difficulties inherent in quantifying the value of ground-water resources, the potential 
benefits of [P]MPs were not monetized.”
18 The courts have interpreted language in the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which gives the EPA 
jurisdiction for the PMP rule, to mean that the EPA should balance the costs and benefits 
of a regulation designed to prevent unreasonable adverse effects
19,20 In addition, President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to show that the benefits of 
economically significant regulations justify the costs.
21 Although the EPA is expected to 
expand on its estimation of the benefits in the final PMP rule, it is doubtful it will provide 
state-specific analyses of the benefits of reducing PMP herbicide contamination. 
Although the EPA did not estimate the benefits of the rule, it reviewed six 
existing studies of contamination. The EPA only presents a range for the ground water 
concentration of each pesticide in each study, rather than a mean concentration, so it is 
impossible to know whether the risk is high or low without looking more closely at the 
studies. The EPA reports, for example, that the concentration of simazine in California 
                                                                                                                                                 
pesticides do not move off-site in all areas of the U.S. and because I cannot assume that the states have 
perfect information about levels of contamination.  
18 USEPA (1996). 
19 According to the EPA, the two provisions of FIFRA that support the use of pesticide management plans 
as a condition of initial registration are the restricted use provisions and the cancellation provision (EPA, 
1993). Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC §136a and § 136d (1972). 
20 The regulatory objective of the EPA’s PMP rule is to prevent unreasonable adverse effects of pesticide 
use, as defined by FIFRA, and to protect the environmental integrity of ground water in the United States. 
Unreasonable adverse effects is defined as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into 
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of any pesticide. Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136(2)(bb) (1972).  7 
ground water ranges from .1 to 2.4 parts per billion (ppb), based on the California Well 
Inventory Database. Later in this paper, I use the same California data to calculate the 
mean concentration of simazine in California. The mean concentration is .3 ppb with an 
upper bound of .35 ppb and a lower bound of .28 ppb, according to data from 1986 to 
1995. The concentration ranged from .05 to 19 ppb, however. During this period, 
simazine was only detected four times at a concentration that exceeded the EPA’s safety 
standard for simazine of 4 ppb.  
The EPA also did not fully estimate the costs of the rule. The EPA found that lost 
productivity and higher pesticide prices resulting from a switch to alternative pesticides 
could cost farmers and consumers between $242 to $254 million annually.
22 It also found 
that the rule could cost pesticide manufacturers between $36 million and $46 million 
annually in lost sales and ground water monitoring expenditures. The most controversial 
cost estimate, however, is the estimate of state program costs because the EPA did not 
define the criteria it will use to approve state plans. The EPA states that “An acceptable 
Plan must, to the satisfaction of the Administrator, demonstrate that monitoring activities 
(including ground-water monitoring) performed pursuant to the Plan are appropriate for 
the purposes of the Plan, with assurances that the activities will be carried out 
adequately”
23 Without more information about what the EPA may consider “appropriate” 
or “adequate,” it is difficult for states to know what the EPA expects, and therefore how 
much the PMP rule will cost. The EPA further states that “most states will find it 
necessary to expand their ground water monitoring programs to meet additional criteria 
established in the plans.”
24 The EPA does not, however, estimate how many more ground 
water samples per year the states should collect, or how many new wells states should 
construct. 
Since the EPA did not define the criteria is will use to approve state plans, it did 
not use state-specific data to aggregate the potential costs of state plans. The EPA instead 
based its estimate on the annual costs of Wisconsin’s ongoing ground water protection 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 According to Executive Order 12866, an “economically significant” rule is generally one that has an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.  
22 The agency did not specify the year dollars for all the estimates mentioned in this section, although the 
estimates are probably in 1992 or 1993 dollars. All the numbers in this section are taken directly from the 
Federal Register notice and the economic analysis of the proposed rule. 
23 See USEPA (1996a), p. 33297.  
24 USEPA (1996b), p. IV-21. 8 
program. The costs of ground water monitoring can vary dramatically by state, however, 
depending on the level of pesticide use, depth of aquifers, and other factors. Based on an 
estimate of $500,000 per year per pesticide management plan, the EPA estimates that the 
PMP program will cost states approximately $60 million annually for the first ten years 
of the program. While the EPA appears to think that Wisconsin is representative of the 
higher end of costs to a state of a pesticide management plan, the EPA could require 
states to expand their ground water monitoring beyond the scope of Wisconsin’s 
program.
25  
The EPA states in the preamble to the proposed rule that it “believes the proposed 
action is the most cost-effective and least burdensome alternative to the alternatives 
considered in the development of the Pesticides and Ground-Water Strategy, developed 
as the groundwork for today’s proposed rule.”
26 The EPA considered only four 
alternatives: federal mandated restrictions (such as national standards or label changes), 
outright cancellations, the “do nothing” alternative, and the PMP rule. The EPA asserts 
that the PMP rule is better than the other alternatives, although it provided very little 
information about the benefits and costs of each alternative. For example, the EPA states 
in the preamble that it did not analyze the “do nothing” alternative, which would leave 
pesticides and ground water management to the states. According to the EPA, “this 
alternative was not analyzed because it clearly failed to meet the regulatory objective. 
Such an option that freely permits contamination would entail no direct regulatory costs, 
but the far larger reduction in the value of the resource must be compared to the more 
conventional economic impacts.”
27 Given that the EPA provided no analytical foundation 
for its belief in a “far larger reduction” and extensive state efforts to protect ground water, 
                                                 
25Furthermore, the economic analysis of the proposed rule indicates that the EPA does not have current 
information on the level of ground water monitoring. The EPA uses national data on ground water 
sampling from 1971 to 1991, for example, to provide the reader with some idea of sampling efforts in each 
state and therefore the potential costs of sampling. Evidence suggests, however, that these numbers 
underestimate current levels of sampling. In California, for example, there were 4,908 simazine samples 
between 1986 and 1995, while the EPA estimates that there were 2,931 simazine samples in California 
between 1971 and 1991. California Well Inventory Database, 1986-1995 and USEPA (1996b).  
26 USEPA (1996a), p. 33295. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires agencies to identify 
alternatives to a proposed action, and select the least burdensome alternative that achieves the desired 
social objective, or explain why it did not choose the least burdensome alternative. Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act, 2 USC § 1535 (1995).  
27 USEPA (1996a), p. 33295. 9 
the EPA should evaluate the “do nothing” alternative to determine the extent of 
justifiable federal involvement.  
The EPA also did not consider variations of the PMP rule as alternatives. The 
EPA could have, for example, built in flexible reporting and implementation 
requirements for those states that historically do not have problems with the PMP 
herbicides. It could have specified the level of ground water monitoring that states must 
conduct to meet the EPA’s approval, based on the level of pesticide use and the 
vulnerability of ground water to contamination. It could have built further flexibility into 
the process by allowing states to submit plans for the top five pesticides with potential to 
contaminate ground water in each state. Instead, the EPA picked five pesticides that 
nationwide are used on average more than other pesticides. Without a discussion of such 
alternatives, the EPA cannot claim that it chose the least burdensome alternative. 
The EPA could improve its analysis of the benefits and costs of protecting ground 
water by first gathering more information about the benefits of reducing contamination in 
different states, and then using that information to estimate the risk to human health and 
environment. As demonstrated in the next section with an example of ground water 
contamination in California, it is possible to unearth more information on the benefits of 
contamination reduction than the EPA cites in the proposed rule. Furthermore, a good 
analysis of the benefits and costs of the EPA’s policy should include a comparison of the 
risk from ground water contamination to other risks to human health and the 
environment. It should also include an evaluation of risks of alternative pesticides or 
other risks that could increase as a result of efforts to reduce ground water contamination. 
 
IV. The Benefits and Costs of Reducing Simazine Contamination in California’s     
San Joaquin Valley 
 
 I demonstrate an approach to estimate the costs and benefits of protecting ground 
water in this section, based on a study of simazine contamination in California’s San 
Joaquin Valley.
28 First, I provide some background information on the history of 
                                                 
28 The analysis in this section is tailored to pesticides and ground water management, but the principles on 
which it is based are widely recognized components of policy analysis. See, for example, Stokey and 
Zeckhauser (1978).  10 
simazine use and contamination in California. Second, I estimate the benefits of ground 
water contamination reduction in the Valley. Third, I discuss the costs of banning the 
PMP herbicides in California and the costs of ground water monitoring.  
 The California Department of Pesticide Regulation, responsible for developing a 
management plan if the PMP rule is finalized, contends that existing data show little risk 
to human health from ground water contamination resulting from PMP herbicide use. The 
Department further asserts that California’s existing ground water protection program is 
sufficient to prevent and control ground water contamination. The EPA, on the other 
hand, asserts that the Department does not have enough data to assess the extent and 
severity of ground water contamination in California, and therefore additional monitoring 
and ground water protection measures are necessary to learn more about the risk.
29 Both 
agencies are correct, because although California operates an effective ground water 
contamination prevention program, California cannot claim it knows the actual level of 
risk from ground water contamination. It is unlikely, however, that gathering additional 
information will show that the risk is greater than existing data suggest because 
California monitors frequently in areas of high simazine use. 
Simazine is the most heavily used of all the PMP herbicides in California. 
Simazine is used in California on fruit, vegetable, and nut crops, and over 70% of 
California’s simazine use is in the San Joaquin Valley.
30 Over 40% of simazine use is in 
two of the Valley’s eight counties, Fresno and Tulare. California supplies over 50% of 
the total value of the nation’s fruits and nuts, the majority of which are grown in the San 
Joaquin Valley.
31 As a result of the high simazine use, California has focused its simazine 
monitoring efforts in the San Joaquin Valley. Almost two-thirds of all samples for 
simazine collected in California over a ten-year period were in the San Joaquin Valley.
32  
I used ground water monitoring data from the Well Inventory Database, a 
collection of monitoring results from all California agencies dating back to 1986, to 
calculate the mean concentration of simazine in ground water in every county in the San 
Joaquin Valley, in every year for which data were available. Assuming that only wells 
                                                 
29 The opinions of the CDPR and the EPA in this section are the result of conversations with Pat Dunn of 
the CDPR and Jan Baxter of the EPA, both of whom were involved with the PMP process in 1997. 
30 Author’s calculation based on California pesticide use data. See Moyle (1997).  
31 USEPA (1996b). 
32 Moyle (1997).  11 
not covered by the Safe Drinking Water Act are potentially contaminated by pesticides, I 
used 1990 U.S. Census data to calculate the number of small wells serving less than 25 
people in each county in the San Joaquin Valley.
33 I assumed that each of these wells 
served between eight and sixteen people.
34 I then used the EPA’s standard risk 
assessment guidelines and assumptions to calculate the number of cancer cases averted if 
simazine is eliminated from San Joaquin Valley ground water.
35  
While simazine is detected frequently in San Joaquin Valley ground water, 
especially in Fresno and Tulare counties, it is not detected in concentrations that pose a 
risk to human health. The mean concentration of simazine in San Joaquin Valley ground 
water ranges in different counties between 0 to .76 ppb, well below the Maximum 
Contaminant Level (MCL) of 4 ppb set by the EPA with an adequate margin of safety.
36 
The table below presents my estimates of the mean concentration, which excludes wells 
in which no simazine was detected. The upper and lower bounds of the mean 
concentration calculation are based on a 95% confidence interval. The table shows that 
simazine is detected frequently in the ground water of Fresno and Tulare counties, but the 
concentration of simazine has exceeded the EPA’s MCL only once in over ten years. 
 
 
                                                 
33 See Moyle (1997). The U.S. Census defines a “small” well as one that is not connected to a public water 
system, and that provides water for four or fewer houses, apartments, or mobile homes. I calculated the 
number of small wells in each county for the years 1997 to 2006, the timeframe for my analysis. I therefore 
adjusted the 1990 data by applying population growth estimates calculated by the state of California.   
34 I assumed between eight and sixteen people drink from each well for two reasons. First, the U.S. Census 
question defines an individual well as one that serves four or fewer houses. I therefore multiplied four 
houses by two people per household and four people per household to arrive at my estimate of eight to 
sixteen people per well. According to the EPA, the national average per household is 2.64 people (USEPA, 
1996a, p. 33290).  
35 Cancer risk is the easiest of all benefits from ground water contamination reduction to quantify using 
EPA risk assessment techniques. It is much more difficult to quantify existence value or similar benefits of 
ground water protection. Boyle et al. (1994) summarize existing studies that attempt to estimate the value 
protecting ground water from nitrates and other unspecified pollutants. They conclude that significant 
differences exist between ground water values, but that additional studies are necessary before valuation 
results will have policy relevance.  
36 The mean concentration in Stanislaus county is high because one detect in 1988, out of 28 detects over 
ten years, measured 6.60 ppb. 12 
Mean Concentration of Simazine in San Joaquin Valley Counties, 1982-1995    
(parts per billion) 


















Fresno  0.23   0.24   0.21   842  334  0 
Kern  0.16   0.39   0   176  4  0 
Kings  0.11   0.11   0.11   80  1  0 
Madera  0   0   0   85  0  0 
Merced  0.36   0.84   0   160  6  0 
San Joaquin 0   0   0   170  0  0 
Stanislaus  0.76   1.23   0.29   194  28  1 
Tulare  0.32   0.34   0.29   1376  629  0 
 
The number of cancer cases averted if simazine is eliminated from San Joaquin 
Valley ground water ranges from 2 to 23 over a ten-year period, or .3 to 2.3 per year, 
using the EPA’s risk assessment guidelines and conservative assumptions about the 
number of people exposed to each potentially vulnerable drinking water well.
37 In 
addition, the annual risk to human health from drinking water from a contaminated well 
does not exceed one in a million for any county in the San Joaquin Valley. This risk is 
less than the risk incurred by travelling 150 miles by car, living 2 months with a cigarette 
smoker, and flying 1,000 miles by jet.
38 All of these activities carry an annual risk of one 
in a million. 
I tested a number of different scenarios to reflect the uncertainty associated with 
the population exposure estimates and the number of contaminated wells. The range of 
cancer cases averted is based on the assumption that the concentration of simazine in 
each contaminated well is the mean concentration. The low end of the range assumes 
eight people drink from each well and that only a percentage of small wells are 
contaminated. The high end of the range assumes that sixteen people drink from each 
well and all small wells are contaminated. I used the percentage of total wells sampled 
                                                 
37 I built conservative assumptions into my analysis to reflect the uncertainty about the level of risk that 
stems from a lack of information about some of the factors that contribute to ground water contamination, 
discussed in the first section of this paper. For a more detailed description of my assumptions and the risk 
assessment methodology, see Moyle (1997).  
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with contamination from the Well Inventory Database as an estimate of the percentage of 
small, contaminated wells for the low-end scenario. 
The costs of the PMP rule in California are difficult to estimate because the EPA 
did not define its criteria for approving state management plans. The EPA states in the 
proposed PMP rule that it will probably require states to increase their ground water 
monitoring, however, although it did not provide reliable estimates of the costs of 
additional ground water monitoring. It also states that it will ban the PMP herbicides if 
the state does not develop a plan the EPA will approve, but does not estimate the costs of 
a ban.
39 While estimating the potential costs of increased ground water monitoring was 
beyond the scope of this analysis, I compared an estimate of the costs of a ban in 
California to my estimate of the benefits of a ban.  
Hueth and Cohen estimated the total costs of a ban of the five herbicides in 
California.
40 Using data from 1993, Hueth and Cohen estimated that the direct costs of a 
ban on all five herbicides to consumers and producers in California is between $20 
million to $35 million dollars per year.
41 These cost estimates are based on the increase in 
the cost of production when farmers switch to more expensive alternatives to the PMP 
herbicides. Hueth and Cohen also surveyed California farmers to determine whether they 
would change their production practices if forced to switch to alternatives, and whether 
they expected yields to drop as a result of the switch. The farmers decisively responded 
that crop yields are not expected to drop because of a switch to an alternative herbicide, 
because although more expensive, the alternatives are equally effective. In addition, the 
farmers did not expect to change their production practices. As a result, the increase in 
the price of alternative pesticide relative to the PMP herbicides is the only cost Hueth and 
Cohen considered. They did not include the administrative and enforcement costs 
associated with a ban.  
                                                 
39The EPA indicates in the economic analysis of the proposed rule that farmers will switch to more 
expensive alternative pesticides if the EPA bans the PMP pesticides, but does not calculate the aggregate 
costs of a ban. The EPA lists the major alternatives to the PMP herbicides, the main crops on which they 
are used, the percentage of acreage to which each PMP herbicide and its alternatives is applied, and 
provides a simple cost comparison between the PMP herbicides and the alternatives. 
40 Hueth And Cohen (1996).  
41 Hueth and Cohen (1996). The estimate is in 1993 dollars. Hueth and Cohen calculated the costs of a ban 
using equations to estimate the short-run changes in marginal production costs for a single crop developed 
by Lichtenberg et al. (1993) and Sunding (1996). Hueth and Cohen picked 11 of the main crops in 14 
As discussed earlier, eliminating simazine contamination of ground water in the 
San Joaquin Valley would save .3 to 2.3 lives per year, and a ban on all the PMP 
herbicides will cost California between $20 and $35 million per year. Assuming a value 
of life between $3 million and $8 million per life saved, the benefits from cancer cases 
averted from simazine contamination reduction in the San Joaquin Valley is between $1 
and $18 million per year.
42 Several adjustments are necessary to compare these benefits 
to the cost of a ban, some of which increase the risk estimate and some of which decrease 
the estimate.  
Including atrazine in the analysis of the benefits would at most double the 
estimate of the benefits of a ban.
43 From 1986 to 1995, atrazine was detected 209 times 
and simazine was detected 563 times in California ground water. The mean concentration 
of atrazine in California ground water during that time was .36 ppb, with an upper bound 
of .44 ppb and a lower bound of .28 ppb. The EPA’s MCL for atrazine is 3 ppb. The 
benefits from a ban on metolachlor, alachlor, or cyanazine are insignificant. Alachlor was 
detected twice from 1986 to 1995, and cyanazine and metolachlor were never detected.
44 
Including the rest of the state in the analysis will also increase the benefits, although not 
by a significant amount because approximately 70% of California simazine use is in the 
San Joaquin Valley. Furthermore, the mean concentration of simazine in the rest of 
California is only .37 ppb, with an upper bound of .53 ppb and a lower bound of .22 ppb. 
The estimate of the benefits also does not include the benefits from reducing “dread” of 
the risk of contamination.  
The analysis also significantly overestimates the benefits of a ban. It does not 
consider that many individuals drinking water from small wells sometimes monitor their 
own wells, filter their own water, or drink bottled water. Pesticide manufacturers could 
                                                                                                                                                 
California on which PMP herbicides are used and applied the Lichtenberg/Sunding method to calculate the 
total welfare loss from a total ban on the use of the herbicides on each crop. 
42 The value of life is established in the economics literature, based on studies of willingness-to-pay for an 
increase in risk in labor markets. See Viscusi (1993). The estimates are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index (CEA, 1999). Alternatively, Van Houtven and Cropper have estimated the EPA’s 
implicit value of a life at $60 million per cancer case avoided (adjusted to 1993 dollars), based on a study 
of the EPA’s actions on cancer-causing pesticides from 1975 to 1989. The ban is therefore possibly 
consistent with past EPA actions. It is unclear, however, whether members of society agree with this 
valuation of life so I did not use it in my analysis. See Van Houtven and Cropper (1996).   
43 Other benefits could include those from non-cancer risks and ecological risks, although given the low 
levels of contamination it is unlikely these benefits are large. 
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also develop replacements to the PMP herbicides that could off set the risk reduction, 
even if the replacements are less harmful than the PMP herbicides.
45 Most importantly, a 
ban on the PMP herbicides will result in an increase in the use of existing alternative 
herbicides. Hueth and Cohen found that farmers would substitute bromicil or a 
combination of oxyfluorfen and diuron for simazine.
46 Bromicil and diuron are already 
detected frequently in California ground water, although more research is necessary to 
determine the risk of these herbicides relative to simazine. From 1986 to 1995, for 
example, bromicil was detected in California ground water 190 times, diuron was 
detected 362 times, and simazine was detected 563 times.
47 
A switch to alternative herbicides could require changes in application practices 
that could increase the risk to pesticide applicators, a risk widely recognized by the EPA 
and the regulatory community as a significant public policy issue.
48 Another potential 
increase in risk, although difficult to quantify, is the change in fruit and vegetable 
consumption from an increase in the price of production related to higher substitute 
pesticide prices.
49 Consideration of these factors could further reduce the already low 
estimates of the benefits of the PMP rule.  
Since the EPA proposed the PMP rule as an alternative to a ban on the five 
pesticides, the agency apparently recognizes the high costs of a ban relative to the 
benefits. The EPA has indicated that a primary component of the state management plans 
is increased ground water monitoring.
50 The purpose of increased ground water 
monitoring is primarily to reduce uncertainty about the level of risk, although ground 
water monitoring data also provides information about the success of various measures to 
reduce ground water contamination. Concern about uncertainty is justified because the 
                                                 
45 Novartis is replacing alachlor with acetochlor. Ciba-Geigy has developed a substitute for metolachlor 
that they have not yet released for sale. Personal communication with Bob Fugitt, Chemist, Dupont 
Chemical Company, June 1996.  
46 Hueth and Cohen further report that farmers will switch from cyanazine to oxyfluorfen or prometryn. 
47 Moyle (1997). 
48 Goldman (1996). For a discussion of the tradeoffs between economic benefits and worker health safety, 
see Harper and Zilberman (1992). 
49 There is a strong science base indicating that consumption of fruits and vegetables reduce the risk of 
many diseases. See Liebman (1996). 
50Personal communication with Jan Baxter, EPA Region IX, Barry Patterson, New Mexico Department of 
Agriculture, John Smith, North Carolina Department of Agriculture, and Marion Fuller, Florida 
Department of Agriculture. Summer 1996. The EPA writes in the Federal Register notice that “present 
levels of ground water monitoring are inadequate to gauge the levels of overall ground water contamination 
with confidence.” USEPA (1996a). EPA guidance documents also emphasize ground water monitoring. 16 
process through which pesticides reach ground water, and travel through ground water, 
depends on complex hydrogeologic processes that vary by region, if not by acre.
51 In 
addition, the properties of individual pesticides determine the extent to which they 
contaminate ground water.
52 Ground water monitoring is costly, however. The EPA must 
therefore carefully compare the benefits of additional ground water monitoring to the 
costs. 
Although the EPA does not provide very much information on the costs of ground 
water monitoring in its analysis of the proposed PMP rule, the EPA provided such 
information elsewhere.
53 The cost of a ground water monitoring program depends on the 
number of wells that the state must construct for monitoring purposes (related in turn to 
the number of existing wells suitable for monitoring), the number of times per year a well 
is sampled, travel time, the costs of field measurement and sample analysis, the costs of 
equipment and well maintenance, the costs of sample analysis, and the costs of staff 
time.
54  
In its analysis of the PMP rule, the EPA finds that the cost of constructing a 
ground water monitoring well is about $1,690 for a well with a depth of 30 feet.
55 To 
determine the extent of contamination in one spot, it is generally necessary to build 3 to 5 
monitoring wells.
56 Depending on the complexity of the area’s hydrogeology, many 
sampling sites could be necessary to obtain a clear picture of the extent of contamination. 
According to the EPA, it takes an average of 3.5 hours to take field measurements and 
                                                 
51 For a complete discussion of the process through which pesticides reach ground water, see Moyle (1997). 
52 These properties include the rate that a pesticide dissolves in water and its ability to sorb to soil. The 
composition of the soil, the level of irrigation, and the level of precipitation also could effect the risk of 
ground water contamination in some areas. For more information, see Barbash (1996).  
53 The EPA provided ongoing and initial compliance costs for two types of ground water monitoring 
programs in an evaluation of the estimated costs of programs under the Resource, Conservation, and 
Recovery Act. USEPA (1997).  
54 A typical monitoring program, according to the EPA, is composed of the following tasks: development of 
work plan, field investigation, report of results, design of monitoring system, installation of ground water 
monitoring wells (if necessary), maintenance of wells, calculation of ground water flow rate and direction, 
presampling activities, field measurement and sample collection, sample analysis, and evaluation of data 
quality. USEPA (1997). 
55 See USEPA (1996b). The cost of well construction varies from state to state. The cost depends on the 
depth of the well, the type of soil, and other factors.  
56 While existing drinking water wells could be used for monitoring instead of building new wells, 
monitoring wells are generally preferred because drinking water wells are typically deep and open to a 
number of aquifers below the surface to capture the maximum amount of water possible. Samples from 
these wells do not represent contamination in a particular aquifer because of dilution, which makes it 
difficult to determine the source of contamination. 17 
collect samples from monitoring wells, excluding travel time. Staff time can range 
anywhere from $50 to $100 per hour.
57 Laboratory analyses of samples range from $176 
to $328 per sample.
58 As is clear from this simple description of potential costs, increased 
ground water monitoring can rapidly use up available resources.  
In California, the benefits of additional ground water monitoring are probably 
low. First, existing data indicates that the risk from ground water contamination resulting 
from PMP herbicide use is low. Second, current ground water monitoring efforts are 
focused in areas of high simazine use. Existing data is therefore sufficient to estimate 
risk, and perhaps overestimates the risk. Approximately 40% of California’s simazine use 
is in Fresno and Tulare counties, for example, and 45% of all California ground water 
samples for simazine were collected in Fresno and Tulare between 1986 and 1995.
59 
Even if simazine use increases in the future, it is unlikely that contamination will increase 
enough to pose significant risks to human health and the environment.   
V.  Recommendations for Improving the PMP Rule 
 
Each state should balance the benefits and costs of taking additional action 
beyond current efforts to protect ground water, similar to the California analysis 
presented in the previous section. If these analyses support my findings that the risk from 
PMP contamination is low and existing ground water protection programs are working, it 
is unlikely that extensive federal involvement in state ground water protection activities is 
necessary. 
 Although extensive federal involvement is not necessary, the EPA could use the 
PMP process to continue to help states improve their ground water protection programs at 
low cost. The EPA could develop a clearinghouse of information about ground water 
protection strategies. It could provide information on best management techniques to 
reduce pesticide use and give advice on ground water monitoring techniques. It could 
further help states assess the vulnerability of soil to ground water contamination, and 
provide information on how to clean up ground water contamination resulting from 
accidental spills or illegal dumping of large quantities of pesticides. The EPA could 
                                                 
57 USEPA (1997). 
58 USEPA (1997). 
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survey the ongoing activities of states and share success efforts with states developing or 
improving their ground water protection programs. The EPA could further help states 
access and use ground water databases, such as that of the National Pesticide Survey 
conducted by the United State Geological Survey. 
The EPA could also mount an information campaign aimed at educating residents 
of vulnerable areas about the need to regularly monitor drinking water wells for pesticide 
residues, assuming that some residents are unaware of the potential risk.
60 The EPA could 
further provide assistance to residents who monitor their own wells with monitoring kits 
available through mail-order catalogs. 
Finally, the EPA could look more closely at policies that encourage states to 
reduce pesticide use at the source, rather than specifically targeting ground water 
contamination.  Such policies include the use of precision technologies to improve 
pesticide application, cropping, and irrigation techniques. These improvements could also 
reduce important risks from other sources, such as worker exposure, and could further 




The EPA’s new regulation to protect ground water will probably not significantly 
decrease health risks. Existing evidence suggests that the risk from ground water 
contamination is low and states have effective ground water protection programs. The 
EPA should therefore carefully evaluate whether to require states to undertake additional 
ground water monitoring or other ground water protection activities. Such requirements 
could consume resources that states might otherwise use to reduce more significant risks 
to human health and the environment.  
                                                 
60 Smith et al. (1990) evaluated how different types of informational materials explaining the risks from 
radon influenced people’s perception of these risks. They find that risk communication policies can be 
effective in modifying risk perception. See also Smith et al. (1995). 19 
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